The model
• Infinitely repeated version of standard agency model
• The principal owns a technology that produces y t at time t.
y t is drawn from F (y t |a t ) where a t ∈ [a,ā] is the action taken at the beginning of t by the agent who operates the technology. After y t has been observed, the agent gets paid I t .
• The principal has access to perfect credit markets.
• Moral hazard: a t is not observed by the principal.
• Preferences:
Agent:
The contract design problem
An optimal contract is a sequence of strategies {I, a} = {I(σ t ), a(σ t )} such that I maximizes S(I, a) subject to W (I, a) ≥w and W (σ t , I, a) ≥ W (σ t , I,ā) for all σ t and for allā.
Reduction of the problem
Let w denote the discounted expected utility of the agent at the beginning of the period. Any solution to the contract design problem can be characterized by 4 functions a(w), I(w, y), U (w, y) and V (w) which satisfy:
V (w) = {G (y − I(w, y)) + αV (U (w, y))} f (y|a(w))dy for all w (iii)
Additional assumptions
A.1 α = β.
A.2
The principal is risk-neutral, and G(y − I) = y − I.
A.4 f (y|a) is twice continuously differentiable in a.
A.5 The monotone likelihood ratio condition holds, i.e. f a (y|a)/f (y|a) is an increasing function of y.
A.6 The first-order approach is valid.
The problem is to choose a(w), I(w, y) and U (w, y) to max {y − I(y, w) + βV (U (w, y))}f (y|a(w))dy subject to
Proposition 4.1 The optimal contract satisfies
{y − I(w, y) + βV (U (w, y))}f a (y|a(w))dy +µ(w) {φ(I(w, y)) + βU (w, y)}f aa (y|a(w))dy − ψ ′′ (a(w)) = 0 where λ(w) is the multiplier on (PK) and µ(w) is that on (IC). 
